Background

In the congruence $a \equiv b \bmod n$, the value n is the modulus.

Refer the more general entry on ►modular arithmetic.

Monitoring

►Eavesdropping

Monotone Signatures

David Naccache
Département d'informatique, Groupe de cryptographie, École normale supérieure, Paris, France

Related Concepts

►Blackmailing Attacks; ►Digital Signatures

Definition

A monotone signature is a process allowing to resist, to some extent, blackmailing attacks. A monotone signature admits ℓ keys-pairs $\{pk_i, sk_i\}$. The scheme is such that a signature s generated with sk_i is verifiable with respect to all pk_j for $j \leq i$. Hence in case of blackmailing, the signer can reveal the key sk_i and inform users that pk_i is obsolete (switch to pk_{i+1}). The legitimate signer always uses sk_ℓ to sign messages.

Recommended Reading

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Montgomery Arithmetic

Çetin Kaya Koç[1], Colin D. Walter[2]
[1]College of Engineering and Natural Sciences, Istanbul Sehir University, Uskudar, Istanbul, Turkey
[2]Information Security Group, Royal Holloway University of London, Surrey, UK

Related Concepts

►Modular Arithmetic; ►Modular Exponentiation

Definition

Suppose a machine performs arithmetic on words of w bits. Let a, b, and n be cryptographically sized integers represented using s such words. Then the Montgomery modular product of a and b modulo n is $abr^{-1} \pmod n$ where $r = 2^{sw}$. This is computed at a word level using a particularly straightforward and efficient algorithm. Compared with the normal "school book" method, for each word of the multiplier the reduction modulo n is performed by adding rather than subtracting a multiple of n, only a single digit is used to decide on this multiple, and the accumulating product is shifted down rather than up.

Background

The modular reduction $u \pmod n$ is typically computed on a word-based machine by repeatedly taking several leading digits from u and n, obtaining the leading digit of their quotient, and using that multiple of n to reduce u. This takes a number of clock cycles on a general processor, and the machine has to wait for carries to propagate from lowest to highest word before the next iteration can take place. Peter Montgomery designed his algorithm [5] to simplify or avoid these bottlenecks so that the modular exponentiations typical of public key cryptography could be significantly speeded up. The consequent initial and final scalings by a power of r are relatively cheap. Resource-constrained environments such as those in a smart card or RFID device benefit particularly from the choice of this modular multiplication algorithm.

Theory

Introduction

In 1985, P. L. Montgomery introduced an efficient algorithm [5] for computing $u = a \cdot b \pmod n$, where a, b, and n are k-bit binary numbers. The algorithm is particularly suitable for implementation on general-purpose computers (signal processors or microprocessors) which are capable of performing fast arithmetic modulo a power of 2. The Montgomery reduction algorithm computes the resulting k-bit number u without performing a division by the modulus n. Via an ingenious representation of the residue class modulo n, this algorithm replaces division by n with division by a power of 2. The latter operation is easily accomplished on a computer since the numbers are represented in binary form. Assuming the modulus n is a k-bit number, i.e., $2^{k-1} \leq n < 2^k$, let r be 2^k. The Montgomery reduction algorithm requires that r and

n be relatively prime, i.e., $\gcd(r,n) = \gcd(2^k,n) = 1$. This requirement is satisfied if n is odd. In the following, the basic idea behind the Montgomery reduction algorithm is summarized.

Given an integer $a < n$, define its *n-residue* or *Montgomery representation* with respect to r as

$$\overline{a} = a \cdot r \pmod{n}.$$

It is straightforward to show that the set

$$\{i \cdot r \pmod{n} \mid 0 \le i \le n-1\}$$

is a complete residue system, i.e., it contains all numbers between 0 and $n-1$. Thus, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the numbers in the range 0 and n–1 and the numbers in the above set. The Montgomery reduction algorithm exploits this property by introducing a much faster multiplication routine which computes the n-residue of the product of the two integers whose n-residues are given. Given two n-residues $\overline{a}$ and $\overline{b}$, the *Montgomery product* is defined as the scaled product

$$\overline{u} = \overline{a} \cdot \overline{b} \cdot r^{-1} \pmod{n}$$

where r^{-1} is the (multiplicative) inverse of r modulo n (see ►Modular Arithmetic), i.e., it is the number with the property

$$r^{-1} \cdot r = 1 \pmod{n}.$$

As the notation implies, the resulting number $\overline{u}$ is indeed the n-residue of the product

$$u = a \cdot b \pmod{n}$$

since

$$\begin{aligned}\overline{u} &= \overline{a} \cdot \overline{b} \cdot r^{-1} \pmod{n} \\ &= (a \cdot r) \cdot (b \cdot r) \cdot r^{-1} \pmod{n} \\ &= (a \cdot b) \cdot r \pmod{n}.\end{aligned}$$

In order to describe the Montgomery reduction algorithm, an additional quantity n' is needed. This is the integer with the property

$$r \cdot r^{-1} - n \cdot n' = 1.$$

The integers r^{-1} and n' can both be computed by the extended *Euclidean algorithm* [2]. The Montgomery product algorithm, which computes

$$\overline{u} = \overline{a} \cdot \overline{b} \cdot r^{-1} \pmod{n}$$

given $\overline{a}$ and $\overline{b}$, is given below:

function MonPro($\overline{a}, \overline{b}$)

Step 1. $t := \overline{a} \cdot \overline{b}$
Step 2. $m := t \cdot n' \pmod{r}$
Step 3. $\overline{u} := (t + m \cdot n)/r$
Step 4. **if** $\overline{u} \ge n$ **then return** $\overline{u} - n$
else return $\overline{u}$

The most important feature of the Montgomery product algorithm is that the operations involved are multiplications modulo r and divisions by r, both of which are intrinsically fast operations since r is a power 2. The MonPro algorithm can be used to compute the (normal) product u of a and b modulo n, provided that n is odd:

function ModMul(a, b, n) {n is an odd number}

Step 1. Compute n' using the extended Euclidean algorithm.
Step 2. $\overline{a} := a \cdot r \pmod{n}$
Step 3. $\overline{b} := b \cdot r \pmod{n}$
Step 4. $\overline{u} :=$ MonPro($\overline{a}, \overline{b}$)
Step 5. $u :=$ MonPro($\overline{u}, 1$)
Step 6. **return** u

A better algorithm can be given by observing the property

$$\text{MonPro}(\overline{a}, b) = (a \cdot r) \cdot b \cdot r^{-1} = a \cdot b \pmod{n},$$

which modifies the above algorithm to:

function ModMul(a, b, n) {n is an odd number}

Step 1. Compute n' using the extended Euclidean algorithm.
Step 2. $\overline{a} := a \cdot r \pmod{n}$
Step 3. $u :=$ MonPro($\overline{a}, b$)
Step 4. **return** u

However, the preprocessing operations, namely, steps (1) and (2), are rather time-consuming, especially the first. Since r is a power of 2, the second step can be done using k repeated shift and subtract operations. Thus, it is not a good idea to use the Montgomery product computation algorithm when a single modular multiplication is to be performed.

Montgomery Exponentiation

The Montgomery product algorithm is more suitable when several modular multiplications are needed with respect to the same modulus. Such is the case when one needs to

compute a modular exponentiation, i.e., the computation of $M^e \pmod n$. Algorithms for modular exponentiation decompose the operation into a sequence of squarings and multiplications using a common modulus n. This is where the Montgomery product operation MonPro finds its best use. In the following, modular exponentiation is exemplified using the standard "square-and-multiply" method, i.e., the left-to-right *binary exponentiation method*, with e_i being the bit of index i in the k-bit exponent e:

function ModExp(M, e, n) {n is an odd number}

Step 1. Compute n' using the extended Euclidean algorithm.
Step 2. $\overline{M} := M \cdot r \pmod n$
Step 3. $\overline{x} := 1 \cdot r \pmod n$
Step 4. **for** $i = k - 1$ **down to** 0 **do**
Step 5. $\quad \overline{x} := \text{MonPro}(\overline{x}, \overline{x})$
Step 6. $\quad$ **if** $e_i = 1$ **then** $\overline{x} := \text{MonPro}(\overline{M}, \overline{x})$
Step 7. $x := \text{MonPro}(\overline{x}, 1)$
Step 8. **return** x

Thus, the process starts with obtaining the n-residues $\overline{M}$ and $\overline{1}$ from the ordinary residues M and 1 using division-like operations, as described above. However, once this preprocessing has been completed, the inner loop of the binary exponentiation method uses the Montgomery product operation, which performs only multiplications modulo 2^k and divisions by 2^k. When the loop terminates, the n-residue $\overline{x}$ of the quantity $x = M^e \pmod n$ has been obtained. The ordinary residue number x is recovered from the n-residue by executing the MonPro function with arguments $\overline{x}$ and 1. This is easily shown to be correct since

$$\overline{x} = x \cdot r \pmod n$$

immediately implies that

$$x = \overline{x} \cdot r^{-1} \pmod n = \overline{x} \cdot 1 \cdot r^{-1} \pmod n := \text{MonPro}(\overline{x}, 1).$$

The resulting algorithm is quite fast, as was demonstrated by many researchers and engineers who have implemented it; for example, see [1, 4]. However, this algorithm can be refined and made more efficient, particularly when the numbers involved are multi-precision integers. For example, Dussé and Kaliski [1] gave improved algorithms, including a simple and efficient method for computing n'. In fact, any exponentiation algorithm can be modified in the same way to make use of MonPro: simply append the illustrated pre- and postprocessing (steps 1–3 and 7) and replace the normal modular multiplication operations in the iterative loop with applications of MonPro to the corresponding n-residues (steps 4–6 in the above).

Here, as an example, the computation of $x = m7^{10} \pmod{13}$ is illustrated using the Montgomery binary exponentiation algorithm.

- Since $n = 13$, the value for r is taken to be $r = 2^4 = 16 > n$.
- Step 1 of the ModExp routine: Computation of n':
  The extended Euclidean algorithm is used to determine that $16 \cdot 9 - 13 \cdot 11 = 1$, and thus $r^{-1} = 9$ and $n' = 11$.
- Step 2: Computation of $\overline{M}$:
  Since $M = 7$, $\overline{M} := M \cdot r \pmod n = 7 \cdot 16 \pmod{13} = 8$.
- Step 3: Computation of $\overline{x}$ for $x = 1$:
  $\overline{x} := x \cdot r \pmod n = 1 \cdot 16 \pmod{13} = 3$.
- Step 4: The loop of ModExp:

e_i	Step 5	Step 6
1	MonPro(3,3) = 3	MonPro(8,3) = 8
0	MonPro(8,8) = 4	
1	MonPro(4,4) = 1	MonPro(8,1) = 7
0	MonPro(7,7) = 12	

  - Step 5: Computation of MonPro$(3,3) = 3$:
    $t := 3 \cdot 3 = 9$
    $m := 9 \cdot 11 \pmod{16} = 3$
    $u := (9 + 3 \cdot 13)/16 = 48/16 = 3$
  - Step 6: Computation of MonPro$(8,3) = 8$:
    $t := 8 \cdot 3 = 24$
    $m := 24 \cdot 11 \pmod{16} = 8$
    $u := (24 + 8 \cdot 13)/16 = 128/16 = 8$
  - Step 5: Computation of MonPro$(8,8) = 4$:
    $t := 8 \cdot 8 = 64$
    $m := 64 \cdot 11 \pmod{16} = 0$
    $u := (64 + 0 \cdot 13)/16 = 64/16 = 4$
  - …
- Step 7 of the ModExp routine: $x = \text{MonPro}(12,1) = 4$
  $t := 12 \cdot 1 = 12$
  $m := 12 \cdot 11 \pmod{16} = 4$
  $u := (12 + 4 \cdot 13)/16 = 64/16 = 4$

Thus, $x = 4$ is obtained as the result of the operation $7^{10} \pmod{13}$.

Efficient Montgomery Multiplication

The previous algorithm for Montgomery multiplication is not efficient on a general purpose processor in its stated form, and so perhaps only has didactic value. Since the Montgomery multiplication algorithm computes

$$\text{MonPro}(a, b) = abr^{-1} \pmod n$$

and $r = 2^k$, it is possible to give a more efficient bit-level algorithm which computes exactly the same value

$$\mathrm{MonPro}(a,b) = ab2^{-k} \pmod{n}$$

as follows:

function MonPro(a,b) {n is odd and $a,b,n < 2^k$}

Step 1. $u := 0$
Step 2. **for** $i = 0$ *to* $k-1$
Step 3. $\quad u := u + a_i b$
Step 4. $\quad u := u + u_0 n$
Step 5. $\quad u := u/2$
Step 6. **if** $u \geq n$ **then return** $u - n$
$\quad$ **else return** u

where u_0 is the least significant bit of u and a_i is the bit with index i in the binary representation of a. The oddness of n guarantees that the division in step (5) is exact. This algorithm avoids the computation of n' since it proceeds bit-by-bit: it needs only the least significant bit of n', which is always 1 since n' is odd because n is odd.

The equivalent word-level algorithm only needs the least significant word n'_0 (w bits) of n', which can also be easily computed since

$$2^k \cdot 2^{-k} - n \cdot n' = 1$$

implies

$$-n_0 \cdot n'_0 = 1 \pmod{2^w}.$$

Therefore, n'_0 is equal to $-n_0^{-1} \pmod{2^w}$, and it can be quickly computed by the extended Euclidean algorithm or table lookup since it is only w bits (1 word) long. For the words (digits) a_i of a with index i and $k = sw$, the word-level Montgomery algorithm is as follows:

function MonPro(a,b) {n is odd and $a,b,n < 2^{sw}$}

Step 1. $u := 0$
Step 2. **for** $i = 0$ *to* $s-1$
Step 3. $\quad u := u + a_i b$
Step 4. $\quad u := u + (-n_0^{-1}) \cdot u_0 \cdot n$
Step 5. $\quad u := u/2^w$
Step 6. **if** $u \geq n$ **then return** $u - n$
$\quad$ **else return** u

This version of Montgomery multiplication is the algorithm of choice for systolic array modular multipliers [6] because, unlike classical modular multiplication, completion of the carry propagation required in Step 3 does not prevent the start of Step 4, which needs u_0 from Step 3. Such systolic arrays are extremely useful for fast *SSL*/*TLS* servers.

Application to Finite Fields

Since the integers modulo p form the *finite field* $GF(p)$, these algorithms are directly applicable for performing multiplication in $GF(p)$ by taking $n = p$. Similar algorithms are also applicable for multiplication in $GF(2^k)$, which is the finite field of polynomials with coefficients in $GF(2)$ modulo an irreducible polynomial of degree k [3].

Montgomery squaring (required for exponentiation) just uses MonPro with the arguments a and b being the same. However, in fields of characteristic 2, this is rather inefficient: all the bit products $a_i a_j$ for $i \neq j$ cancel, leaving just the terms a_i^2 to deal with. Then it may be appropriate to implement a modular operation ab^2 for use in exponentiation.

Secure Montgomery Multiplication

As a result of the data-dependent conditional subtraction in the last step of MonPro, embedded cryptosystems which make use of the above algorithms can be subject to a *timing attack* which reveals the secret key [9]. In the context of modular exponentiation, the final subtraction of each MonPro should then be avoided [7]. With this step omitted, all I/O to/from MonPro simply becomes bounded by $2n$ instead of n, but an extra loop iteration may be required on account of the larger arguments [8].

Recommended Reading

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Moore's Law

Burt Kaliski
Office of the CTO, EMC Corporation, Hopkinton, MA, USA

Related Concepts

►Exhaustive Key Search; ►Exponential Time; ►Polynomial Time

Definition

Moore's Law states that the amount of computing power available for a given cost will increase by a factor of two every 18 months to 2 years.

Background

Moore's Law was articulated in 1965 by Gordon Moore of Intel [1].

Theory

The phenomenal rise in computing power over the past half century – which has driven the increasing need for cryptography and security as covered in this work – is due to an intense research and development effort that has produced an essentially exponential increase in the number of transistors than can fit on a chip, while maintaining a constant chip cost.

Roughly speaking, the amount of computing power available for a given cost has increased and continues to increase by a factor of 2 every 18 months to 2 years, a pattern called *Moore's Law* after Gordon Moore of Intel, who first articulated this exponential model. More specifically, the amount of computing power $P(t)$ available for a given cost at time t may be estimated as

$$P(t) = P(t_0)\, 2^{(t-t_0)/T}$$

where $P(t_0)$ is the amount of computing power available for the same cost at a reference time t_0, and T is the interval between doublings in computing power (e.g., 1.5 or 2 years). Lenstra and Verheul have formalized the treatment such growth rates in their model for estimating the strength of cryptographic key sizes over time [2].

Applications

The implications of Moore's Law to cryptography are twofold. First, the resources available to users are continually growing, so that users can readily employ stronger and more complex cryptography. Second, the resources available to opponents are also growing. Effectively, the strength of any cryptosystem decreases by the equivalent of one symmetric-key bit every 18 months – or 8 bits every 12 years – posing a challenge to long-term security. This long-term perspective on advances in (classical) computing is one motivation for the large key sizes currently being proposed for many cryptosystems, such as the *Advanced Encryption Standard* (►Rijndael/AES), which has a 128-bit symmetric key.

The benefit of Moore's Law to users of cryptography is much greater than the benefit to opponents, because even a modest increase in computing power has a much greater impact on the key sizes that can be used, than on the key sizes that can be broken. This is a consequence of the fact that the methods available for using cryptosystems are generally ►polynomial time, while the fastest methods known for breaking ►symmetric cryptosystems and several asymmetric cryptosystems are ►exponential time.

This contrast between using and breaking algorithms may well be limited to classical computing for current algorithms. Quantum computers pose a more substantial potential threat in the future, because methods have been discovered for breaking ►public-key cryptosystems based on integer factorization or the discrete logarithm problem in ►polynomial time on such computers [3]. Quantum computers themselves are still in the research phase, and it is not clear if and when a sufficiently large quantum computer could be built. But if one were built (perhaps sometime in the next 30 years?), the impact on cryptography and security would be even more dramatic than the one Moore's Law has had so far.

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